Webinar on ‘Is an Economic Being a “Social Moron”? Using Game Theory to Explore Moral Behaviour’: 9 Oct. 2020
A Webinar on ‘Is an Economic Being a “Social Moron”? Using Game Theory to Explore Moral Behaviour,’ was presented by Dr Thiagu Ranganathan, Associate Professor, CDS and Mr Rounak Sil, MA Scholar, CDS over CISCO Webex Meetings on Friday, the 9th of October, 2020, at 3.30 pm. Professor Krishnendu Ghosh Dastidar, Professor, JNU was the moderator of the webinar.
Abstract: This paper uses game theoretic framework to analyse moral behavior described in two games proposed by Basu (2019) – “After the Seminary” and “Samaritan’s Curse”. The original games indicate a dilemma where concern towards a bystander by the players results in worsening of the outcomes for the bystander. The games present a scenario where even when the ‘rational’ being is concerned about someone else, it worsens the outcomes for the bystander. In such a context, only punishment or incentives could be used to ensure the socially desirable outcome. We investigate the paradox and analyse it using incomplete information, regret/dissapointment, evolutionary game theory, and Kantian morality. The findings indicate the importance of viewing morality using a non-consequential framework.
Webinar on ‘Is an Economic Being a “Social Moron”? Using Game Theory to Explore Moral Behaviour’: 9 Oct. 2020
A Webinar on ‘Is an Economic Being a “Social Moron”? Using Game Theory to Explore Moral Behaviour,’ was presented by Dr Thiagu Ranganathan, Associate Professor, CDS and Mr Rounak Sil, MA Scholar, CDS over CISCO Webex Meetings on Friday, the 9th of October, 2020, at 3.30 pm. Professor Krishnendu Ghosh Dastidar, Professor, JNU was the moderator of the webinar.
Abstract: This paper uses game theoretic framework to analyse moral behavior described in two games proposed by Basu (2019) – “After the Seminary” and “Samaritan’s Curse”. The original games indicate a dilemma where concern towards a bystander by the players results in worsening of the outcomes for the bystander. The games present a scenario where even when the ‘rational’ being is concerned about someone else, it worsens the outcomes for the bystander. In such a context, only punishment or incentives could be used to ensure the socially desirable outcome. We investigate the paradox and analyse it using incomplete information, regret/dissapointment, evolutionary game theory, and Kantian morality. The findings indicate the importance of viewing morality using a non-consequential framework.